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Trade Liberalization, Skilled Intermediate input and Wage distribution 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper proposes a simple theoretical model of a small open economy comprising of four 
sectors including formal and informal ones. One sector produces skilled intermediate input for 
the importable production. Though other two sectors use labour and capital (land), labour is 
segregated as skilled or unskilled. Following traditional specification we also assumed that the 
skilled labours are employed in the formal sector and unskilled labours are employed in the 
informal sector. One of the distinguishing features of the present paper is the use of skilled 
intermediate input in import competing sector. So, in a sense import competing sector uses both 
skilled and unskilled labour. In such backdrop we tried to study the impact of trade liberalization 
on absolute and relative wage(s). It has been found that irrespective of factor intensity ranking 
both types of workers lose owing to tariff cut whereas under reasonable condition wage disparity 
between skilled and unskilled workers is reduced. These results seem to be quite sensible though 
the structure is slightly different from the conventional set up. 
 
 
JEL classification: D5; J31 
Keywords: informality; skilled- unskilled labour; wage gap 
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1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of World War II, there were significant structural changes particularly in the 
developing economies as they started to liberate themselves from decades of colonial despotism 
(Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay, 2009). These economies wear then characterized by the 
existence of a developed urban market economy and a backward agriculture-oriented subsistence 
economy. It was expected that the growth of organized economic activities would foster national 
development. But, industrial development could not keep space with the massive rural-urban 
migration and the surplus urban labour force was compelled to generate and survive in the 
informal sector. Thus, the presence of the formal and informal sector is seen in almost all the 
countries of the world right from their early history. The primary distinction between these two 
sectors rests on the laws of regulations of labour markets. Informal sector is one where there is 
absence of government protection and recognition and absence of trade union. The workers of 
informal sector are not covered under minimum wage legislation and social security system 
either. Conventionally they earn low income and wages. They do not even enjoy any fringe 
benefits from institutional sources. In general they are characterized by low educational level, 
poor financial capacity, possessing low skills, strenuous working conditions, and low bargaining 
capacity due to the lack of organizational skills. In rural areas, the bulk of the informal sector 
workers comprise of landless agricultural labourers, small and marginal farmers, sharecroppers, 
persons engaged in animal husbandry and fishing, forest workers, workers in agro-processing 
units, artisans such as weavers, blacksmiths, carpenters and goldsmiths etc. On the other hand, 
the urban informal sector comprises of manual labourers in construction, carpentry, trade and 
transport, small and tiny manufacturing enterprises, street vendors and hawkers, rag pickers etc.    
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The term organized or formal and unorganized or informal is used synonymously in National 
Accounts System. Generally, the organized or formal sector comprises of enterprises for which 
statistics is available regularly from budget documents or reports, annual reports in case of public 
sector and through the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) in case of registered manufacturing for 
India. On the other hand, unorganized or informal sector refers to those enterprises whose 
activities are not regulated under any legal provisions and/or which do not maintain any regular 
audit accounts (Marjit and Kar, 2011). The informal sector accounts for about two thirds of the 
labour force in developing countries. Informal wages are market determined competitive wage 
where there is no control of government. On the other hand, wages in the formal sector are 
determined by negotiations between the trade unions and the employer. Thus it is very obvious 
that formal labour enjoy a higher wage than the informal labour. The wage differential between 
the two sectors is highly influenced by the migration of labour, skill of the workers, availability 
of jobs, liberalization policies adopted by the domestic country, level of corruption1 and many 
other factors. The effects of international migration of skilled and unskilled labour on its wage 
inequity depend on both the relative capital intensities between the low-skilled and high-skilled 
sectors and the institutional nature of the markets for unskilled labour (Yabuuchi and Chaudhuri 
2007). A reduction of tariff restriction on import of low-skill manufacturing product worsens the 
skilled-unskilled wage inequality but wage inequality improves owing to an inflow of foreign 
capital under reasonable factor intensity condition (Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi, 2007). There is a 
possibility of a decline in the relative wage of the unskilled labour following an improvement in 
the terms of trade (Marjit, Beladi and Chakrabarti, 2004). On the other hand, informal wages, 
informal employment as well as informal production increase across occupational types due to 
trade liberalization in import competing sector (Marjit and Kar, 2005, 2009). Corruption has its 
                                                 
1 Corruption, as an institutional factor affects wage-inequality between the skilled and unskilled workers.  
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adverse effects not only on efficiency but also on the incentive to invest and thereby on the 
development process of an economy (Bardhan, 1997). A change in the degree of corruption 
affects the size of the corruptive (formal and informal) sector. Lower degree of corruption 
benefits capitalists. Effect of corruption on wage-inequality depends on the loose bored by the 
sectors due to increase in return to capital (Mandal and Marjit, 2010). On the other hand, it is 
argued that the size of the intermediation sector increases if unskilled labour using formal sector 
is capital intensive in comparison to its informal counterparts (Mandal, 2011). 
In developing countries, a substantial proportion of employment and output generation are 
concentrated in the informal sector (Schneider et al., 2010). Informal employment in India has 
expanded in the post-reform period and there has been a shift of workers from the formal to the 
informal sector during the initial years of liberalization (Dev, 2000). The reports based on 
periodic employment and unemployment surveys (EUS) conducted by the National Sample 
Survey Organization  during July 2011 to June 2012 suggests that the estimated employment in 
the informal component is about 75 per cent of total usual status employment (principal and 
subsidiary) in the rural areas and about 69 per cent in the urban areas. There is overwhelming 
presence of informal sector not only in India but also in other developing and under developed 
countries all over the world. It accounts for 50-80% employment in South Asia, 30-50% in South 
East Asia, 40-50% in Africa, 55% in Latin America and Caribbean, 24% in Southern Europe, 
10% in Western Europe, 18% in Canada and 8% in USA (Mandal and Chaudhuri, 2011). 
In this backdrop we develop a theoretical model a la Jones (1965) having both formal and 
informal sectors. The basic results we derive in this paper are: irrespective of factor intensity 
ranking both skilled and unskilled wage decrease consequent upon trade liberalization, whereas 
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relative wage disparity crucially hinges on factor intensity ranking. Therefore, the results indicate 
the role of factor intensity assumption in determining which kind of labor is going loose much. 
 
The present paper is divided into a number of sections. Section II discusses the background 
literature. Section III comprises of the structure and equations of the model along with their 
solutions. Section IV discusses the findings and finally section V includes the conclusion. Some 
mathematical details are placed in the Appendix. 
 
1. Background Literature 
In developing economies, workers employed in the untaxed, unregulated sector tends to be 
younger 2 , have less education, and earn less than their counterparts in the formal sector 
(Thomas,1992, Maloney 1999;). In many LDCs, the public or the government sector is a large 
employer of labour outside agriculture which has yielded to pressure to increase wages of their 
existing workforce, which reduces its potential for hiring new workers with its budget constraints 
(Mazumdar, 1983). The consequence is that the urban economy is characterized by widening 
wage differentials between the formal and residual sectors with a declining proportion of the 
urban labour force employed in the former. According to the traditional labour market 
segmentation theory (Fields 1975, Dickens and Lang 1985, Agenor and Montiel 1996), wages 
may differ between the formal and informal sectors workers of equal potential. In this case 
informal employment is portrayed as a strategy for escaping involuntary unemployment. 
Sometimes, workers or firms voluntarily select into the informal sector given their preferences 
and skills or, in order to avoid taxes or regulatory legislation (De Soto 1989, Maloney 1999, 
                                                 
2 However, this may not be necessarily true. But, while in the process of job search younger people are likely to 
work in the informal sector 
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Cunningham and Maloney 2001). Under such circumstances, wages in the informal sector may 
not necessarily be lower than the formal sector wage. Instead, wages of informal sector workers 
may exceed those of formal sector workers with the same observable characteristics, especially 
for those who are self-employed (Maloney 1998, 1999,). There is  substantial literature showing 
that the wage gap between the formal and informal or the skilled and unskilled workers is 
influenced by different trade policies adopted by the domestic countries, emigration of labour 
and factor mobility between the different sectors (Marjit and Kar 2005, 2008a, 2008b, 2009;  
Marjit 2003, Marjit and Acharyya 2006, Marjit and Maiti 2006, Mandal and Chaudhuri 2011 
etc.). Further the wages of formal and informal sector are interdependent. In a small open 
economy the informal wage increases due to a rise in formal wage by reducing the return on 
capital (Carruth and Oswald, 1981 and Leamer 1998).3 But in case of a closed economy or an 
economy with some monopoly power in world trade, the result is just the reverse. Here, an 
increase in the formal wage depresses the informal wage (Carruth and Oswald, 1981). The 
experience of East Asia in 1960s and 1970s shows that greater openness to trade tends to narrow 
the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in developing countries. But the experience 
of Latin America in 1980s was completely the opposite (Wood, 1997).   
So, liberalization policies adopted by the developing countries play a major role in the 
determination of wages of informal sector workers. A lot of researchers have focused on the 
issue of the impact of trade reform on the size and wages of informal sector using the general 
equilibrium framework. Marjit (2003), Marjit and Kar (2004, 2008a, 2008b), Marjit et al.(2007a, 
2007b, 2009) show theoretically that informal wages may rise or fall depending on the 
assumptions about capital mobility between formal and informal sectors, improvement of skill-
                                                 
3 Increase in the minimum wage reduces profits. Capital moves to informal sector boosting both the earnings and 
employment of informal workers.  
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based service and productivity rather than physical capital accumulation, the factor intensity of 
the sector that is being hurt by trade liberalization. These models show how changes in the 
exogenous policy variables affect the wages and employment conditions in the informal sectors. 
In most of the models it is shown that informal wage increases through contraction of formal 
sector due to liberalization. A reduction in tariff leads to the contraction of formal sector. The 
displaced workers from the formal sector crowd over the informal sector for subsistence. Along 
with the movement of labour force if unused capital also moves into the informal counterpart 
then the informal wage may boost up. Marjit (2003) argued that even if a part of the informal 
sector is vertically linked with the formal sector, the income of the unskilled workers employed 
in the informal sector may rise following a contraction of the formal sector and consequent 
expansion of the informal sector due to the liberalization policy. Marjit, Kar and Sarkar (2003) 
also provided evidence that there has been a substantial growth in the informal wage in most 
parts of India in the post reform period. An empirical study shows that the urban informal wage 
has increased substantially for workers hired under Non-Directory Manufacturing enterprises in 
India over the period of 1984-85 and 2000-01 (Marjit and Kar, 2004). With limited degree of 
capital mobility trade reform reduces the informal wage which is the conventional wisdom 
obtained under a partial equilibrium framework. However, with increased mobility of capital this 
result is reversed.  Marjit and Kar (2007) postulated that degree of capital mobility between the 
two sectors determines the wage movement of the informal workers. If the displaced workers of 
the formal sector are accompanied by fresh investment in the informal sector then they may be 
the gainer. Capital mobility between the formal and informal sector is crucial when there is one 
formal and one informal sector but not when there is a pair of formal as well as informal sector. 
When there exist two informal sectors that are prototypes of the formal sectors, simple Stolper-
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Samuelson argument shows why informal wage improves as a result of the adoption of 
liberalization policies (Marjit, Kar and Beladi 2007b). The same issue of capital mobility has 
also been dealt by Marjit and Maiti (2006). Trade liberalization in the import competing sector 
raises the informal wage across occupational types, and also the informal employment. It has 
also been shown that real informal wage increases with trade reform and it further leads to 
reduction of urban poverty (Kar and Marjit, 2009). The consequences of international factor 
movements on skilled-unskilled wage inequality crucially depend on the difference in the 
intersectoral factor intensities between the skilled labour and capital in presence of 
unemployment. There is a possibility in the deterioration in wage inequality following an inflow 
of foreign unskilled labour (Beladi, Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi, 2008). Moreover, wage inequality 
can move up or down with the presence of corruptive sector which uses both the skilled and 
unskilled labours. Impact on absolute wages depends on the factor intensity rankings within the 
productive as well as the corruptive sectors (Mandal and Marjit, 2010)4.    
In Mexico the wage gap between the skilled and unskilled workers widened as a result of the 
adoption of liberalization policies in 1985. Examining the data on 2,354 Mexican manufacturing 
plants for 1984-90 and Mexican Industrial Census data for 1966-88, it was found that the 
reduction in tariff protection in 1985 disproportionately affected low-skilled industries (Hanson 
and Harrison, 1999). Goods from the low skilled sector may have experienced a fall in price 
because of increased competition from economies with reserves of cheap unskilled labour larger 
than Mexico’s. The consequent increase in the relative price of skilled intensive goods explains 
the increase in wage inequality. Trade liberalization, however, has an ambiguous effect on the 
informal sector, since the evidence from Brazil shows no or little connection between trade 
                                                 
4 The paper does not consider informality but introduces corruption as an institutional issue in a general equilibrium 
framework.  
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policy and informality. But for Colombia liberal trade policies has led to the expansion of the 
informal sector (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003).  
 
2. The Model and its Solution 
Let us consider a small open economy with two formal sectors (X and Z), an informal sector (Y) 
and a sector producing an intermediate commodity (K) with the help of skilled labour only to be 
used in the production of formal import competing good, X. Both the formal sectors produce 
traded commodities. X is an import competing commodity produced with the help of unskilled 
labour (L) and the intermediate commodity (K) and this sector is protected by an import tariff (t), 
which artificially raises the price of X. X may be considered as electronic goods manufacturer as 
mobile phones or camera. The intermediate commodity (K) may be a software development firm 
which develops gaming software used in mobile phones. Liberalization implies a decline in this 
tariff rate denoted by t. Z is an exportable commodity produced using skilled labour (S) and land 
(T) which may be considered as a firm manufacturing nuclear reactors or mechanical appliances. 
Commodity Y is a non-traded one produced in the informal setup using unskilled labour (L) and 
land (T). Wage in the formal sector is set fixed by prior negotiations with the labour unions. 
Formal wage (𝑤ഥ ) is higher than the informal wage (w) because labour laws allow various 
benefits to formal workers but not to the informal workers. Again, wage of skilled labour(𝑤௦) is 
higher than that of formal wage (𝑤ഥ). Thus 𝑤௦>𝑤ഥ>w. 
All the factors of production are fully employed. Workers who do not find a job in the formal 
segment must move to the informal segment to survive and there is no open unemployment in 
the economy. Labour is heterogeneous and skilled workers receive a higher premium. The 
production functions are neo-classical types with constant returns to scale (CRS), diminishing 
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marginal productivity for factor inputs and operate in perfectly competitive market. To build the 
system of equations (following Jones (1965), (1971), we use the traditional notations like 𝑤ഥ , 𝑤௦, 
w, R, t, 𝑃௞ , X, Y, Z, 𝑃௑ ,𝑃௬ , Pz, 𝑆ഥ  , 𝐿ത , 𝑇ത , 𝐾ഥ, 𝑎௜௝ , 𝜃௜௝ 5. The general equilibrium structure of the 
model is given by the following equations comprising of the competitive price equations from 
(1) to ( 4) as factor endowments and full employment conditions for each input through 
equations (5) to (8). 
 
𝑃௞ = 𝑊௦𝑎௦௞             ………………………………. (1) 
𝑃௑(1 + 𝑡) = 𝑊ഥ 𝑎௅௫ +  𝑃௞𝑎௞௫  ……………………. (2) 
𝑃௒ = 𝑤𝑎௅௬ + 𝑅𝑎்௬  ……………………………… (3) 
𝑃௭ = 𝑊௦𝑎௦௭ + 𝑅𝑎்௭ ……………………………… (4) 
𝑎௞௫𝑋 = 𝐾     ……………………………………… (5) 
𝑎௅௫𝑋 + 𝑎௅௒𝑌 = 𝐿ത   ……………………………….. (6) 
𝑎்௒𝑌 + 𝑎்௭𝑍 = 𝑇ത …………………………………. (7) 
𝑎௦௞𝐾 + 𝑎௦௭𝑍 = 𝑆̅   …………………………........... (8) 
The commodity prices are given from the rest of the world. We intend to check the effects of 
tariff cut on endogenously determined factor prices and the wage gap between the skilled and 
unskilled workers who are employed in formal and informal sector respectively. 
The four price variables in the model𝑃௞ , 𝑊௦  , w and R are determined from the four price 
equations with exogenously given commodity prices 𝑃௑, 𝑃௒ and Pz in the following way. Given 
                                                 
5 𝑤ഥ=Wage of skilled labor, 𝑤௦= Wage of skilled labor, w= Informal wage, R= return to land, t= Exogenously 
imposed import tariff rate,𝑃௞= Price of intermediate good, X= Output of formal importable,Y= Output of informal 
sector, Z= Output of non-traded formal sector, 𝑃௫ , 𝑃௬ , 𝑃௭ = 𝐸𝑥𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠, 𝑆̅, 𝐿ത, 𝑇ത𝐾ഥ= Total supply 
of skilled labor, unskilled labor, land and intermediate commodity respectively, 𝑎௜௝= Input coefficients, 𝜃௜௝= 
Relative share of ith input in the total value of the jth commodity where i=S,L,T,K and j=K,X,Y,Z, ‘^’ represents 
percentage changes for particular variables. 
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the formal wage 𝑤ഥ  and the exogenous price of commodity X (Px), the price of intermediate input 
(𝑃௞ ) is obtained from equation (2) in terms of tariff rate t. Substituting this value of 𝑃௞  in 
equation (1) we determine𝑊௦. Again using the value of 𝑊௦  in equation (4) we determine the 
return to land (R) as Pz is also determined in the rest of the world. Finally substituting the value 
of R and 𝑊௦ in equation (3) we determine w. 
Differentiating equations (1) to (4) and using the zero profit condition and envelope theorem we 
get the following mathematical results. These results will help us later in exploring the effects of 
trade liberalization. Detailed calculations are given in the appendix. 
𝑃௞෢ =  𝛼
௧መ
ఏೖೣ
<o as ?̂? < 0 --------------------          (9) where𝛼 = ௧
ଵା௧
> 0 
𝑊௦෢ = 𝛼
௧መ
ఏೖೣఏೞೖ
<0 as ?̂? < 0 --------------------        (10) 
𝑅෠ = (−)𝛼 ௧
መఏೞೋ
ఏೖೣఏೞೖఏ೅ೋ
>0 as ?̂? < 0-------------  (11) 
𝑤ෝ = 𝛼 ௧
መఏೄೋఏ೅ೊ
ఏೖೣఏೞೖఏ೅ೋఏಽೊ
<0 as ?̂? < 0 --------------   (12)  
The wage gap (𝑊௦෢ − 𝑤ෝ) is given by 
𝑊௦෢ − 𝑤ෝ = 𝛼?̂?
ఏ೅ೋିఏ೅ೊ
ఏೖೣఏೞೖఏ೅ೋఏಽೊ
   ……………………..  (13) 
3. Tariff cut and wages 
Suppose the tariff rate decreases due to the introduction of economic reforms. From equation (9) 
to (12) we find that 𝑃௞෢, 𝑊௦෢ , and 𝑤ෝ  decreases as ?̂? < 0. Thus the return to intermediate input, 
wage of skilled labour and unskilled labour decreases with reduction in tariff rate. Thus, both 
skilled and unskilled workers loose in absolute sense.  
 
Proposition I: A reduction in tariff rate decreases w and 𝑊௦ irrespective of factor intensities. 
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Explanation: From equation (10) and (12) it is found that 𝑊௦෢<0 and 𝑤ෝ<0 as ?̂?<0. This implies 
that wage rate decreases in both the sector with reduction in tariff rate. A reduction in tariff rate 
decreases the return to the intermediate input (K). From equation (1) 𝑊௦  must decrease to 
maintain the equality as skilled labour is the only factor of production. A reduction in 𝑊௦ reduces 
R in equation (4) and further it leads to reduction in w from equation (3). 
In the present model X is a tariff protected import commodity. In general protection is given in 
order to safeguard the domestic industries from low-priced imports of foreign goods. Openness 
in trade or liberalization policy aims at removing all sorts of barriers in international trade. As 
trade opens up the tariff rate or the protection rate (t) decreases and the domestic industry is 
thrown open to face the challenges of international competition. X being a formal sector hires 
labour at a fixed wage, hence the whole impact of reduction in t is born by the intermediate input 
(K) whose unit price decreases instantly. On the other hand, a reduction in tariff rate reduces the 
demand for domestically produced good X since the tariff inclusive price has gone down and 
hence a reduction in demand for the intermediate input (K). Automatically, the return to the 
factor used in the production of K which is skilled labour decreases. This in turn affects the 
export sector of the economy which also uses skilled labour and land. Reduction in the wages of 
skilled labour is compensated by an increase in return to land and it further reduces the unskilled 
wage by affecting the informal sector. 
Proposition II: The relative wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers depends on factor 
intensities. 
Explanation: From equation (13) it may be found that ൫𝑊௦෢ − 𝑤ෝ൯ < 0  if 𝜃்௭ > 𝜃்௬  since 
0<𝜃்௭ , 𝜃்௒ , 𝜃௅௒<1. Thus if the exportable sector uses T more intensively than the informal sector 
then wage inequality decreases due to reduction in tariff rate. As T is used more intensively in 
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sector Z, its return R must increase. Thus from equation (4) 𝑅𝑎்௓ increases. As 𝑃௓ is given 𝑊௦ 
must decrease to compensate the increase in R. Sector Z uses T more intensively than sector Y, 
so its return 𝑊௦ decreases by significant amount. On the other hand, from equation (3), it may be 
found that w must fall as R increases. But as sector Y uses T less intensively than sector Z, 𝑎்௒ 
is low and thus 𝑅𝑎்௬ rises by lower amount. But for sector Z, 𝑎்௭ is high and this reduces w by a 
lesser amount. 
Thus it may be concluded that both 𝑊௦ and w fall with the introduction of trade reform. By 
assumption 𝑊௦ > 𝑤 and according to the given model 𝑊௦ fall by a greater amount than w, thus 
the wage gap between the skilled and unskilled labour decreases. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper has investigated the relationship between trade policy reform and the wage gap 
between the skilled and unskilled workers employed in the formal and informal sector of a small 
open economy. The study finds that the wage gap between the skilled and unskilled workers 
depends on the factor intensities of the formal exportable and informal sector. In the present 
model the common factor of production between these two sectors is land with its return denoted 
as R. If the exportable formal sector uses land more intensively than the non traded informal 
sector then the wage inequality between the skilled and unskilled workers will be reduced and 
vice versa. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
A reduction in the tariff rate and the consequent equations of change are given below. 
Differentiating equation (2) and solving for 𝑃௞෢we obtain, 
 
 15 
 
𝑑𝑃௫(1 + 𝑡)
𝑃௫(1 + 𝑡)
+  
𝑑𝑡
𝑡
𝑡𝑃௫
𝑃௫(1 + 𝑡)
=  
𝑑𝑤ഥ
𝑤ഥ
𝑎௅௫𝑤ഥ
𝑃௫(1 + 𝑡)
+  
𝑑𝑎௅௫
𝑎௅௫
𝑎௅௫𝑤ഥ
𝑃௫(1 + 𝑡)
+
𝑑𝑃௞
𝑑𝑃௞
𝑎௞௫𝑃௞
𝑃௫(1 + 𝑡)
+  
𝑑𝑎௞௫
𝑎௞௫
𝑃௫𝑎௞௫
𝑃௫(1 + 𝑡)
 
 
Since 𝑤ഥ  and 𝑃௫ do not change, and using the envelope condition  
 
[ௗ௔ಽೣ
௔ಽೣ
௔ಽೣ௪ഥ
௉ೣ (ଵା௧)
+  ௗ௔ೖೣ
௔ೖೣ
௉ೣ ௔ೖೣ
௉ೣ (ଵା௧)
= 0] the above expression yields: 
 
𝜃௞௫𝑃௞෢ =  𝛼?̂?, where, 𝛼 =  
௧
(ଵା௧)
and 𝜃௞௫ =  
௔ೖೣ௉ೣ
௉ೣ (ଵା௧)
 , the income share of capital in sector X. 
 
Thus, 𝑃௞෢ =  𝛼
௧መ
ఏೖೣ
< 0 , as, ?̂? < 0                                                                                       (9) 
 
Now differentiating equation (1) and substituting the expression for 𝑃௞෢ we get, 
 
𝑊௦෢ =
ଵ
ఏೖೣఏೞೖ
 𝛼?̂? < 0, as, ?̂? < 0(10) 
Again, using equation (4) and substituting the above information, we obtain  
 
𝑅෠ = (−) ఈ௧
መ
ఏ೅ೋ
ఏೞೋ
ఏೖೣఏೞೖ
> 0, as ?̂? < 0                      (11) 
 
Differentiating equation (3) and substituting the above result yields: 
 
𝑤ෝ = 𝛼?̂? ఏೞ೥
ఏ೅ೋ
ఏ೅೤
ఏಽ೤
ଵ
ఏೖೣఏೞೖ
< 0, as ?̂? < 0                     (12) 
 
Equation (10) and (12) shows that both the wages of skilled and unskilled labour decreases. 
The wage gap (𝑤௦෢ − 𝑤ෝ) is calculated by substituting the values of 𝑤௦ෞ and 𝑤ෝ  from equation (10) 
and (12) respectively. 
The wage gap is given by  
𝑊௦෢ − 𝑤ෝ = 𝛼?̂?
𝜃்௓ − 𝜃்௒
𝜃௞௫𝜃௦௞𝜃்௓𝜃௅௒
 
Now 𝜃்௓, 𝜃்௬ , and 𝜃௅௬>0 Hence,𝜃்௓𝜃௅௬ > 0 
The absolute value of wage gap depends on𝜃்௓and𝜃்௬ . 
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